



THE STATE-SOCIETY/CITIZEN RELATIONSHIP IN SECURITY ANALYSIS: IMPLICATIONS FOR PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION OF U.S. INTERVENTION AND PEACE/STATE-BUILDING OPERATIONS

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
FOREWORD

The United States is a global power with global interests and global responsibilities. The U.S. Army constitutes one of the means available to the United States to pursue and achieve its foreign policy goals. The end of the Cold War, and especially the events of September 11, 2001, have led to a redefinition of the U.S. Army's role. In this new environment, the purpose of the U.S. Army is not only to "win the war" but also to "win the peace."

In this monograph, Dr. Yannis A. Stivachtis, an international security analyst who currently serves as Associate Professor of International and Strategic Studies at Virginia Tech, argues that due to the presence of several "weak" states in the international system, the United States needs to devise and employ strategies aimed at preventing and managing the outbreak of domestic conflicts that have the potential of undermining regional and international peace and stability. He notes that states differ from one another in many ways and therefore their national security question is context dependent. As a result, U.S. strategists should be fully aware of what constitutes a security issue for social groups and individuals in third countries. Thus, U.S. strategic planning and actions should be based on the adoption of the broaden definition of security as well as the idea of human security. Since international stability is based on the stability of states, the United States needs to assist the creation and maintenance of "strong" states.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this monograph as a contribution to the discussions of how to better prepare the U.S. Army to transition from purely military operations (winning the war)

to peace-building operations (winning the peace) and work effectively with local leaders and groups toward creating stronger states.

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr." in a cursive script.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute and
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YANNIS A. STIVACHTIS is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the International Studies Program at Virginia Tech. He also serves as International Security Analyst of the Research Institute for European & American Studies. His previous appointments include: Professor of International Relations at the Geneva School of Diplomacy (Switzerland); Professor of International Relations at Schiller International University (Paris and Leysin, Switzerland); Research Fellow at the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research; Senior Fellow at the Institute for Strategic Studies (Austria); Senior Researcher at ARIS Research and Consulting Office for Security Studies (Austria); and Research Fellow at the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. He has also taught in various diplomatic and military academies. Dr. Stivachtis' research interests include the study of international society at the global and regional level and the examination of the linkages between international society and international security. He teaches in the areas of international politics and security/strategic studies. Dr. Stivachtis' most relevant publications include: *Human and State (In)Security in a Globalized World* (Dubuque, IA: Kendall Hunt, 2011); *International Order in a Globalizing World* (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2007); *International Governance & International Security* (Athens, Greece: ATINER, 2005); *Co-operative Security and Non-Offensive Defense in the Zone of War* (Frankfurt, Germany: Peter Lang, 2001); and *Non-Offensive Defense in the Middle East* (New York: United Nations Publications, 1998). He has written several articles and book chapters published in various journals and edited volumes. Dr. Stivachtis holds a B.A. in international

studies and a postgraduate certificate in international law from Panteion, Greece; and an M.A. and Ph.D. in international relations and strategic studies from Lancaster, UK.

SUMMARY

Whether at the tactical or operational level, effective strategy requires the identification and utilization of the most appropriate means in pursuance of a state's political goals. A mismatch between goals and means would prevent a state from achieving its political objectives and even jeopardize its international position and status.

The U.S. Army constitutes one of the means available to the United States to pursue and achieve its foreign policy goals. The end of the Cold War, and especially the events of September 11, 2001 (9/11), have led to a redefinition of the U.S. Army's role. In this new environment, the purpose of the U.S. Army is not only to win a battle or a war, but also to be involved in effective stabilization operations that would provide the fertile ground for peace- and state-building operations in post-conflict societies. To make the U.S. Army more effective, it requires knowledge about the political, societal, and cultural environment within which these operations would take place as well as the acquisition of a new set of skills that would allow the U.S. Army to handle sensitive situations relevant to this environment.

The United States is a global power with global interests and global responsibilities. Due to the presence of several "weak" states in the international system, the United States needs to devise and employ strategies aimed at preventing and managing the outbreak of domestic conflicts that have the potential to undermine regional and international peace and stability. To be able to design and implement effective preventive or conflict management policies, U.S. policymakers need to have a comprehensive understanding of

the political and security situation in the states experiencing domestic strife. This is especially important if U.S. troops are to be used effectively in humanitarian, stabilization, and peace operations. To avoid oversimplifications in the planning process, U.S. policymakers should have a comprehensive view of the relationship between the state experiencing domestic conflict and its society and citizens. This in turn requires an understanding of the competing identities and loyalties of that state's citizens as well as of intergroup relations. Because states differ from one another in many ways, their national security question is context dependent. Consequently, the United States may need to approach various conflict and security situations in different ways. Since the effective management of a conflict situation is context dependent, U.S. troops will also need to be aware of the possible social and cultural aspects of the peace operations in which they are involved.

For the design and effective implementation of peacemaking and peace- or state-building policies, U.S. strategists should be fully aware of what constitutes a security issue for social groups and individuals in third countries. Thus, U.S. strategic planning and actions should be based on the adoption of a broad definition of security that includes the idea of human security. Since international stability is based on the stability of individual states, the United States needs to assist the creation and maintenance of "strong" states.

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INTRODUCTION

Whether at the tactical or operational level, one of the most fundamental elements of strategy is the ability of a state to identify and utilize the most appropriate means in pursuance of its political goals. In other words, political goals should be defined in terms of the means available to pursue them. If there is a mismatch between a country's goals and means, not only will the chosen strategy be ineffective but, most importantly, the set political goals will not be achieved, which will jeopardize the country's international position and status.

The U.S. Army constitutes one of the means available to the United States to pursue and achieve its foreign policy goals. Traditionally, the U.S. Army has been involved in purely combat operations with a clear mission of achieving military victory. However, the end of the Cold War and especially the events of September 11, 2001 (9/11) have led to a redefinition of the U.S. Army's role. For example, domestic upheavals in failed or semi-failed states have resulted in humanitarian crises that have necessitated the involvement of the international community, in general, and the U.S. military in particular. In this context, the role of the U.S. Army is not to win a battle or a war but to be involved in stabilization operations that would provide the fertile ground for peace- and state-building opera-

tions on these post-conflict societies. In addition, the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq have indicated that the traditional role of the U.S. Army had to be modified to allow it to play an effective role in state and society rebuilding.

Strategic planning and policy formulation requires effective analysis of the security situation in third world countries. In turn, security analysis requires a theoretical framework that would further enrich its analytical capacity and enable U.S. strategists to plan more effective interventionist and peace- or state-building operations. The purpose of this monograph is to provide a framework that focuses on the “idea of state” and its interplay with the other two components of statehood: a state’s physical base and its institutional expression.

To make the U.S. Army more effective in its peace and stabilization operations, it requires knowledge about the political, societal, and cultural environment within which these operations would take place. The U.S. Army also must acquire a new set of skills that would allow it to handle sensitive situations relevant to this environment. One of the most important factors that the U.S. Army should be aware of when getting involved in humanitarian and peace operations is the relationship between the state and its citizens. This relationship, however, is context dependent. In some cases, the state as a whole may serve as the context, but in cases like Afghanistan, this context may be the local community. In other words, people may display greater allegiance to local leaders than to the central government. The realization that states differ from one another and that people have different degrees of allegiance to central authority is fundamental to the successful planning and implementation of peace

and stabilization operations; a fact highlighted by the changing nature of international relations in the post-Cold war era.

THE POST-COLD WAR ENVIRONMENT AND THE U.S. MILITARY

Post-Cold War international relations literature indicates that war today is not the same phenomenon as it was in previous centuries, or even in the 1930s and 1940s, and that it has different sources and takes on significantly different characteristics.¹ Although war has been the major focus of international relations studies for many centuries, our understanding of contemporary wars is not well-served by older analytical approaches. In addition, it is generally recognized that wars today are less a problem of the relations between states than a problem within states.²

Due to the changing nature of conflict and war, the concept of “security” has also been subject to further scrutiny and elaboration. As long as attention was focused on war as an actual or potential condition in the relations between states, there was also a preoccupation with national security. The concept of security was seen almost exclusively in military terms, and the essence of national security policy was to devise military strategies dealing with actual or potential threats coming from the external environment of the state. The attainment of the goals of this national security policy required, in turn, the production and/or acquisition of military means.

Although military considerations remain at the core of states’ security policies, threats of nonmilitary nature, coming both from the internal and external environment of the state, could have a great impact on

state security. Thus, there has been a need to broaden the concept of security, which has, in turn, led to the broadening of the contents of national security policies.³

On the other hand, the concept of “international security” was seen as an extension of the states’ national security policies. Governments were preoccupied with how to manage conflict relations between states. The policies of international institutions and individual states were all designed to manage conflictual interstate relations in order to avoid military confrontation that could threaten both regional states and the international community as a whole. Moreover, specific policies were devised to control the production and acquisition of military means that could lead to arms races, thereby enhancing the power-security dilemma facing states. This could, in turn, lead to violent confrontation between them. Although this preoccupation remains intact, it has become evident that nonmilitary threats can also provoke violent confrontation between states, while domestic strife may lead to regional and international upheaval and invite foreign political, military, or economic intervention.

One of the main sources of international instability in the post-Cold War era has been intrastate conflict. It has been widely recognized that the effects of domestic conflict are difficult to contain, and, consequently, a conflict that occurs within the boundaries of a state may quickly affect the whole region in which this state is geographically embedded. The current situation in Syria and Iraq illustrate this point.

Civil war, nevertheless, is not chronic to all states. It has been suggested that weak states (those lacking sociopolitical cohesion) are the primary locales of present and future wars. Thus, although war has been

a problem that has commanded the attention of strategy and international relations experts, it is now becoming a problem better addressed by scholars dealing with the process of state creation and sustenance. It has been pointed out that one can understand contemporary wars best if one explores the birth of states and how they have come to be governed.⁴ At the same time, the concept of weak states offers a good basis for one to comprehend how intrastate conflict and hence insecurity comes into existence.

The United States is a global power with global interests and global responsibilities. This implies that the United States often needs to deploy its diplomatic, military, economic, and other assets not only in an effort to protect its national political and security interests, but also to provide regional and international order and stability at the request of the international community. At the same time, due to the effects of interdependence, U.S. security is closely tied to the security of other states and regions. Therefore, it is imperative for the United States to be able to prevent and manage domestic conflicts in third world states.

Because intrastate conflict illustrates, among other things, that a state lacks sociopolitical cohesion, that it cannot properly function and therefore its survival may be at stake, it is imperative for U.S. policymakers and strategists to devise two kinds of policies. First, the United States needs to devise and employ conflict prevention strategies. This requires security analysts to provide a systematic and comprehensive analysis of the security situation in third world countries that takes account of a state's societal components (groups) and their organizing ideologies. Unless U.S. policymakers know what groups may be involved in a conflict situation, how these groups think, and what these

groups want, it is difficult to devise effective conflict prevention strategies. Second, once a civil conflict erupts, U.S. policymakers may be in need of a strategy to contain and resolve this conflict. Again, unless U.S. policymakers know what groups are involved in this conflict, what their ideas and ideologies are, and what these groups consequently want, it is difficult not only to keep peace but, most importantly, to devise effective peacemaking, peace-building, and state-building strategies.

The study of post-9/11 U.S. interventions and peace-/state-building operations would reveal a series of shortcomings pertaining to the formulation and, as an extension, the implementation of U.S. policies. Such shortcomings include, but are not limited to, an oversimplified view of the state and its relationship to its society (especially the idea that all states are the same instead of differing from one another); a lack of a comprehensive understanding of the citizens' competing identities and loyalties as well as of intergroup relations in third world countries such as Iraq, Libya, and Afghanistan; and a lack of what constitutes a security issue for social groups and individuals in those countries. Instead, policies were, to a considerable extent, based on the idea of "the enemy of my enemy is my friend," and, therefore, if one could get rid of the "enemy," one would deal with "friends." In other words, the U.S. approach was based on the distinction between "good" and "evil" instead of the distinction between "lesser" and "greater" evil.

In order to understand in what kind of situation the United States wishes to intervene but also what kind of situation the United States needs to create in the post-intervention period, the American analyst and policymaker needs to be familiarized with the

security *problematique* of the target state. In return, this requires familiarization with the types of threats that target states or their citizens face, as well as the security ramifications stemming from intervention.

ANALYZING SECURITY

Security is a complex concept. In order to understand it, one needs to be aware of the political context of the term (intrastate and interstate security) and the several dimensions/sectors within which it operates.⁵ There are five sectors to which the concept of security applies: military, political, economic, societal, and environmental.⁶ These sectors are so interdependent that changes in one sector, whether positive or negative, affect the other sectors.

Military Security.

In the military sector, the referent object of security is mainly the state and military action usually threatens all its components.⁷ It can, for instance, repress the idea of state, subject its physical base to strain and damage and destroy its various national institutions. Military actions can strike the state's basic protective functions and damage the layers of social and individual interest that underlie the state's superstructures. Thus, military insecurity can jeopardize any development process, and this is the reason for which military threats traditionally are accorded the highest priority in national security concerns.

Political Security.

In the political sector, threats to the state may arise both internally and externally.⁸ Internal threats may be the result of governmental actions that pose major threats to individuals or groups. In turn, resistance to the government, efforts to overthrow it, or movements aimed at autonomy or independence may all threaten state stability and enhance state insecurity. As the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan have shown, political development is an important determinant for the internal security of the state, and therefore political security becomes a prerequisite for development, whether societal or economic.

External threats, on the other hand, may endanger the sovereignty of the state as well as “the idea of state,” particularly its national identity, organizing ideology and the institutions that express it. In other words, political threats aim at the organizational stability of the state. Their purpose varies from pressuring the government on a particular issue to disrupting the political functions of the state so as to weaken it prior to military attack.

Political threats stem from the great diversity of ideas and traditions. Because contradictions in ideologies are basic, states of one persuasion may well feel threatened by the ideas represented by others. Threats to national identity, for instance, may involve attempts to heighten the separate ethno-cultural identities of groups within the target state. Thus, an external threat can be transformed into an internal one.

Political threats may be intentional or unintentional, meaning that they may arise structurally from the impact of foreign alternatives on the legitimacy of the state. Such threats may come into existence when

the organizing principles of two states contradict each other in a context where the states cannot ignore each other's existence.

Since the state is an essentially political entity, political threats may be feared as much as military ones. However, the degree to which external political threats can be successfully applied is determined, to a considerable degree, by a state's sociopolitical strength.

Societal Security.

In the societal sector, the referent object of security is collective identities, such as religions and ethnic groups, can function independent of the state.⁹ In relations between states, significant external threats on the societal level are often part of a larger package of military and political threats. Therefore, societal threats can be difficult to disentangle from political or military ones.

At lower levels of intensity, even the interplay of ideas and communication may produce politically significant societal and cultural threats, as illustrated by the reaction of Islamic societies to the penetration of Western ideas. Language, religion, and cultural tradition all play their part in the idea of state, and may need to be defended or protected against cultural imports.¹⁰ If the culture of the state is weak, even the unintended side effects of casual contact could prove disruptive and politically charged.

As in the political sector, threats in the societal sector may arise from the internal or external environment of the state, while an internal threat may be transformed into an external one or *vice versa*. Moreover, if societal security is about the sustainability of traditional patterns of language, culture, and religious

and ethnic identity and custom, then threats to these values come much more frequently from within the states than outside it.

The state- or nation-building process often aims at suppressing, or at least homogenizing, sub-state social identities, as various examples suggest. As a result, internal societal threats may precipitate conflict between states if a country wishes to protect groups of people with whom it has close affinities and who find themselves located in a state that suppresses their rights. However, it is the level of their political strength and development that determines the extent to which states are vulnerable to societal threats. This does not mean that strong states are not subject to those threats. It rather means that a state that is politically advanced is less likely to face serious political and societal threats than a politically less developed state.

Economic Security.

In the economic sector, the referent objects and existential threats are more difficult to pin down.¹¹ The main problem with the idea of economic security is that the normal condition of actors in a market economy is one of risk, competition, and uncertainty.¹² In other words, the actors in the market economy have to be insecure if the system as a whole is to operate effectively. Within the market system, therefore, a significant number of economic threats exist which cannot reasonably be construed as threat to national security.

Although national economy as a whole may serve as an alternative reference object and thus may have a greater claim to survival, only rarely can a threat to that survival actually arise. However, when the consequences of economic threat reach beyond the strictly

economic sector into military and political spheres, then three somewhat clearer national security issues can emerge. The linkages involved are between economic capability on the one hand, and military capability, power, and sociopolitical stability on the other.¹³

A state's military capability rests both on the supply of key strategic materials and the possession of an industrial base capable of supporting the armed forces. When strategic materials must be obtained outside the state, threat to security of supply can be seen as a national security issue. Similarly, an economic decline of basic industries raises questions about the ability of the state to support independent military production. The desire to maintain or acquire production capability in key militarily related industries might easily insert a national security requirement into the management of the national economy. The process can also work in the other direction when the pursuit of military research and development prevents investment in the civil economy.

Economic threats may also enhance domestic instability, especially when states pursue economic strategies based on maximization of wealth through excessive trade. Where complex patterns of interdependence exist, many states will be vulnerable to disruptions in the flows of trade and finance. The link between economy and political stability generates a set of questions about development that could be seen as national security issues. For developing states, such as those of the Middle East, the concern is that because socio-economic structures have come to depend on sustained growth rates and functional specialization, domestic political stability may be undermined by disturbances in the economic systems as whole. Moreover, as the case of the Middle East and North

Africa (MENA) region indicates, economic problems in conjunction with increasing unemployment and high birth rates may lead to rebellions, revolutions, and terrorism that could consequently undermine a state's political security.

Economic threats may be also viewed as an attack on the state, in the sense that conscious external actions by other states results in material loss, strain on various institutions of the state, and even substantial damage to the health and longevity of the population. In this context, economic threats raise concerns about the overall power of the state within the international system. If the economy declines, then the state's power also declines.

Finally, economic threats raise the dilemma of distinguishing between domestic politics and national security. In other words, are other actors or the economic system as whole to blame, or do the causes of weak economic performance lie more within states and societies? If the answer is domestic, then it raises questions as to whether organizing ideologies are being improperly implemented, or whether they are basically flawed and their modification is required as a response. The same answer may also point to the absence of a stable domestic sociopolitical system necessary to provide the fertile ground for economic development.

Environmental Security.

In the environmental sector, the range of possible referent objects is large. The basic concerns, however, are how human beings are related to their physical environment. These types of threats do not operate in isolation from each other, but they interact in several and often contradictory ways.

Environmental threats to national security, like military and economic ones, can damage the physical base of the state, perhaps to an extent sufficient to threaten its idea and institutions. Some environmental threats, for instance, such as pollution, waters distribution and deforestation, link activities within one state to effects in another. Traditionally, such threats have been seen more as matter of fate than a national security issue.

However, the increase of human activity is beginning to affect visibly the conditions for life on the planet. This puts environmental issues more and more into the political arena. At the same time, a linkage between environmental security and development is established whenever the development process positively or negatively affects the environment. When examining the security *problematique* of weak states, attention is primarily focused on the political and societal sectors of security and their side effects.

The Side-effects of Sociopolitical Insecurity.

Due to the interdependence among the various security sectors, sociopolitical security or insecurity may have significant positive or negative implications for the other security sectors. Specifically, sociopolitical insecurity may have two important consequences for economic security. First, it may prevent efforts aimed at economic development or jeopardize existing ones. It is evident that economic development cannot flourish where chaotic political and societal conditions reign. Second, even if a certain level of economic development exists, if sociopolitical stability is absent or at a very low level the mal-distribution of wealth may lead to further sociopolitical upheaval and possibly to

violent domestic conflict. This fear is further increased during periods of fast economic growth.¹⁴

Sociopolitical instability may have four direct implications for military security.

1. It may weaken the state from within and make it unable to resist an external attack effectively.

2. It may reduce the ability of the state to make effective use of its human resources.

3. The state may be obliged to maintain a significant internal police and military apparatus which would increase the military spending and prevent investment in the civil economy.

4. The state may be unable to initiate policies associated with certain cooperative security strategies, such as nonoffensive defense.

Sociopolitical insecurity, in combination with economic insecurity and underdevelopment, can provide the fertile ground for the operation of environmental threats, such as pollution and deforestation, by making the application of the relevant laws impossible. On the other hand, the issue of international water distribution makes it clear that activities within one state may have important ramifications for the security of other states. Water distribution regulation becomes difficult during periods of sociopolitical upheavals, and it therefore may lead to conflict between states. Environmental issues, on the other hand, can also serve as a pretext for the intervention of an external power in the domestic affairs of the target state.

However, one should not conclude that only sociopolitical insecurity can spill over to other security sectors. In fact, the interdependence between the various security sectors implies that, theoretically, any security issue in any security sector can lead to the creation of

security issues in other security sectors. The problem is that security becomes so complex that no particular model can demonstrate the sequence of insecurity dynamics. The inability to study this sequence has significant implications for the formulation of effective security policies.

THE RELEVANCE OF HUMAN SECURITY

When the concept of “security” is invoked, it is generally defined in terms of the threat of or the actual use of violence which undermines the survival of a state. “Human security” moves away from this definition of security in two ways: First, it does not focus only on the use of violence, but also on other ways in which life can be threatened; and second, it shifts the focus from the group to the individual. Since the individual human being is the constituting unit of any society ranging from local to global, while at the same time, the individual is the most basic referent object of security, human security becomes an essential tool for examining and understanding security dynamics in any state, but most importantly in weak states.¹⁵

Human security represents a revolutionary movement away from the traditional understanding of security. Theories centered on concepts such as the balance of power or collective security have always operated under the assumption that, if the state’s borders were safe from external attack, the people living inside the borders would also be safe and secure. However, human security shifts the focus of discussion from states and nations to that of people, and attempts to place the emphasis on the kinds of factors that cause individuals to be insecure by threatening their lives and livelihood. These factors are not necessarily associated

with an external attack on the citizens of a state and can take various forms.

The concept of human security has emerged amid several assumptions about the evolving nature of security following the end of the Cold War, especially due to the negative impacts of the conflicts in the Balkans, Rwanda, and Somalia.¹⁶ First, there has been a nearly universal rejection of the notion that economic growth alone should be considered the main indicator of development. Second, there has been a marked increase in intrastate conflicts in relation to interstate ones (the number of casualties in contemporary intrastate wars is significant, and their negative effects is multiplied when poor health and other factors are considered). Third, globalization has exacerbated the spread of transnational threats such as terrorism and disease. Finally, the cause of human rights has been cited more often in humanitarian interventions.

In short, international security is assumed to be menaced by underdevelopment.¹⁷ It is believed that sustainable development can serve as a foundation for the stability of international politics.¹⁸ This is based upon the experience that disease epidemics and terrorists tend to emerge from states that do not have adequate resources for proper sanitation or to provide proper material benefits or opportunities for their populations.

The basic idea behind the concept of human security is the belief that threats are not isolated to a state or even a region, but are placing everyone in the world in some form of risk. This is not to say that human security implies that all threats are equal regardless of space and time. It rather means that some issues, such as HIV/AIDS (and currently Ebola), may originate in a particular country or region, but eventually

they may have a significant impact upon the world population. Africa experiences these diseases in a far more devastating degree than many other parts of the world, but this does not mean that their effects are limited to just Africa. Moreover, such diseases constitute one of the main contributors to serious political and social unrest inside and between the various nations on the African continent. They also have the potential of creating a humanitarian situation that could affect states economically, as well as morally. Moreover, the risks of abject poverty not only threaten individuals in many areas of the world, but can also destabilize governments. The existence of an unstable government can quickly lead to violence, putting a greater portion of a nation's population at serious risk.

There are several areas of life to which human security applies. Thus one could speak of economic security, health security, food security, environmental security, personal security, and political security.

Economic Security.

Economic security is based upon the assumption that the ability to save, invest in, or access resources is an important part of human life.¹⁹ The most basic understanding of economic security is that of people having access to regular work and, consequently, a reliable income that would allow them to meet their daily needs. Economic security is also expressed as granting the power to individuals to choose among sustainable opportunities, increasing the chances that economic freedom will be preserved in crisis, and that global economic shocks will not decrease freedom.²⁰ In the event that work is unavailable, economic security requires the existence of some kind of "publicly

financed safety net.” Currently, only about a quarter of the world’s population has access to social security and enjoyed protection against unemployment. The latter is not just a concern for poor states, for even wealthy countries must now deal with the problems associated with a weak job market, especially in the current global economy.²¹ States should pursue policies that lead to a minimum standard of living everywhere, because while terrorism is not caused by poverty, it does thrive where despair is prevalent.²²

Food Security.

The concept of “food security” implies that all people should have access to food. This requirement is more complex than it sounds. Food security is based upon the logic that better nutrition increases the capacity for people to do things, especially to earn income and produce valuable goods and services. In turn, people can then use the money earned to buy even more food, and be even more productive. Additionally, having a full stomach increases the chances that one will participate well in the economic, political, and social spheres; to do so, means a move out of the conditions associated with chronic poverty.

The question is not only access to food but, more important, **access to quality food**. People need physical access to food products. This implies that there should be conditions that would allow people to access food, but also there needs to be an infrastructure that would allow food to reach people. In addition to these requirements, people need to have access to financial means that enables them to buy food; an issue that points to the importance and centrality of economic security.²³ Prescriptively, because food is so obviously

linked to survival, it is important for states and the international community to consider immediate, as well as long-term, hunger alleviation strategies.²⁴

Health Security.

Health is defined as “not just the absence of disease, but as a state of complete physical, mental, and social well-being.”²⁵ Disease and poor health are serious threats to both developing and wealthy countries. Health security implies access to health services and the ability to afford at least a minimum level of treatment. Although both poor and wealthy states experience problems associated with health issues, there is a noticeable disparity.

The concept of being healthy is based upon the assumption that illness, disability, and avoidable death are not desirable, and are threats that will never go away. Healthy people are both objectively physically healthy, feel good about their own well-being, and have confidence that the future is healthy and bright. Good health enables people to expand their horizon of choices and opportunities and increases the chances that they can plan for the future. But good or bad health is also felt collectively. An unhealthy person who is irritable or unable to work affects all those around him or her. As such, “good health is a precondition for social stability.”²⁶

Environmental Security.

Although it has been deemphasized as an independent area of human security, environmental security is based upon the assumption that people require healthy land and resources to lead a stable life. En-

vironmental security is more than just the protection from, or government assistance for, dealing with the results of natural disasters such as hurricanes or earthquakes. It is also protection from, and prevention of, manmade environmental degradation. In the developing world, there is increasing difficulty in getting access to clean water, while the life of communities is affected by the combined threat of deforestation and overgrazing that has accelerated desertification.

Personal Security.

Personal security constitutes the most basic understanding of security and is therefore foundational to the entire human security enterprise. All people in the world are at risk from physical violence, while some groups, such as women and children, are at greater risk. All people in all places deserve protection from violence perpetrated by their state, other states, and, in some cases, even themselves. To the regional and global concerns associated with ethnic violence, one has to add concerns related to drug and human trafficking that affects poor and wealthy countries alike. Protection from various sources of violence is also extended to social groups such as families, communities, or organizations.

Political Security.

Political security is required so that people can be active participants in their societies or governments. Human rights are needed so that people can express themselves without fear of repression or governmental control over ideas and information. More recently, the concept of political security has been folded into

other categories to make it more action oriented. For example, instead of simply stating that citizens should be able to participate in a democracy, human security now emphasizes increasing the capacity for citizens to participate. A comprehensive strategy for capacity building includes respecting human rights, increasing economic opportunities, and securing basic through advanced levels of knowledge gained through education.²⁷

Analyzing security with reference to the sectors in which it operates as well as its human dimension helps us realize that security is context dependent, and that different states face different security challenges. Addressing these challenges requires the formulation of policies that are also context dependent. In other words, exporting security policies from one place where they were effectively applied to another does not mean that they would be equally effective. The quality of state to which these policies would apply is a factor that determines the effectiveness of such policies.

WEAK AND STRONG STATES

Strength as a state neither depends on, nor correlates with power. The notion of a weak or strong state refers to the degree of a country's sociopolitical cohesion,²⁸ while the notion of weak or strong power refers to the traditional distinction among states in respect of their military and economic capabilities.²⁹ The notion of a weak state differs fundamentally from the one used to refer to governments that are highly constrained and diffusely structured in relation to their societies.³⁰

Whether a state is weak or strong in terms of its sociopolitical cohesion has little to do with whether it is a weak or strong as a power. Of course, strong states can be strong powers, such as Germany. On the other hand, strong states can be weak powers, like Greece, while weak states can be quite strong powers, like Turkey. Even major powers, like China, have serious weaknesses as states. Thus, they are obliged to maintain extensive internal security establishments. The main difference between weak and strong states is the weak state's low degree of legitimacy.

Any effort to apply the variable of sociopolitical cohesion is confronted by the lack of quantifiable measure. However, this does not prevent it from being a useful tool for analysis.³¹ In fact, this variable has a common sense of applicability. It indicates differences that are large and significant enough to be obvious and important. Thus, it is very difficult to dispute the fact that there are large and significant differences of sociopolitical cohesion among states.

Although no single indicator adequately defines the difference between weak and strong states, there are certain conditions which are expected to be found in weak ones.³² First, they usually experience high levels of political violence, or they are confronted with an ever-existing potential for violence. Second, weak states are characterized by a significant degree of police control over their citizens. Third, weak states face major political conflict over what ideology will be used to organize the state. The tension between secularism and Islamism in Turkey and between nationalism and Pan-Arabism in the Arab countries are examples of dilemmas facing governments concerning what ideology they should use to organize their state. Fourth, weak states lack coherent national identity, or they

experience the presence of contending national identities within their territories. The Afghan and Iraqi cases are indicative of the difficulties of the states in question to construct and maintain a coherent national identity. Fifth, weak states lack a clear and observed hierarchy of political authority. Finally, they experience a high degree of state control over the media.

State Theory.

Before one attempts to analyze in depth the concept of weak states, examine the degree of insecurity they experience within their boundaries and create in their external environment, one needs to adopt a theory of state. Although the state has always been central to the analysis of international relations, in fact it has only been recently discovered that the discipline of International Relations lacks a theory of state. Nevertheless, considerable efforts have already been made by international relations scholars to develop a theory of state. This theory is regarded as a prerequisite to the comprehensive understanding of the security *problematique* facing states.

Three main bodies of thought exist on this subject. First, literature on sociology and political science emphasize the domestic realm of the state over the international one. This literature distinguishes between state and society and tries to understand how they interact.³³ In other words, state and society are seen as being separate, and the state is viewed mainly in politico-institutional terms. In this view, state is equated with government and state security, therefore, coincides with the security of the government. Such identification has important ramifications for international relations. To understand them, one just needs

to consider the case of Iraq during the Saddam Hussein era. According to the above approach, the Iraqi security added nothing to the security of the territory of Iraq nor to that of the population living within it, but only to the security of Saddam Hussein and his government.

Second, the traditional International Relations view of the state emphasizes the international realm at the expense of the domestic structure of states.³⁴ From this systemic perspective, states are seen as territorially defined sociopolitical entities. They represent human communities in which governing institutions and societies are interwoven within a defined territory. In other words, the state is composed of territory, government, and society. But within international anarchy, security issues are conditioned not only by the structure of the international system and the interaction of units, but also by the domestic characteristics of states.³⁵ The reason is that states are partly self-constructed from their own internal dynamics and partly products of the competitive anarchic international system. Consequently, security analysis requires a comprehensive definition of the state that binds territory, government, and society together and which links the internal and systemic perspectives mentioned previously.

The third body of thought has attempted to construct this comprehensive definition by placing state and system into a mutually constitutive relationship.³⁶ The system is easier to grasp when state is understood in terms of the broad sense of territorial, political, and societal nexus. The state is, therefore, analyzed with reference to its three basic components: its idea, its physical base, and its institutional expression.³⁷ Looking at the three components of the state

is one way to appreciate the diversity of states as referent objects for security.

The Idea of State.

The idea of state is central to any security analysis. While the physical basis of the state simply exists and its institutions simply govern, its idea gives substance to its existence and function. By employing the idea of state, one accepts the fact that the state exists primarily on the sociopolitical rather than on the physical plane. Tracing the essence of the state to the sociopolitical level assists one to approach and comprehend the idea of national security. If the essence of the state resides in the idea of it that is held in the minds of its citizens, then that idea itself becomes a major object of national security.

The idea of state, however, might take different forms, and might even be quite different among those who share a common loyalty to a particular state. This notion raises significant security problems. A state without a binding idea among its citizens might be so disadvantaged as to be unable to sustain its territorial integrity. It may also be in danger of losing its sovereignty in a competitive international system. In discussing the idea of the state, one should focus on its two main sources: the nation and the organizing ideologies.³⁸

The State-Nation Relationship.

The importance of nation to the idea of state is highlighted by the concept of national security itself, which implies that the object of security is the nation. This raises questions about the link between state and

nation.³⁹ If the territories of nation and state coincide, then nation would define much of the relationship between state and society. But this is very rarely the case. One is, therefore, obliged to conclude that either the concept of national security has only limited application to the state, or that the relationship between state and nation is a complex one.

The complex relationship between state and nation can be expressed in four models.⁴⁰ Though they represent ideal types, and some states may not fit adequately into them, these models provide a useful framework within which to consider the links between state and nation. They make it clear that national security with regard to the nation-state relationship can be read in several different ways. This implies that different states may experience different kinds of insecurity in relation to the nationality question.

The first of these models is the **nation-state**. This model implies that the nation precedes the state and plays a significant role in giving rise to it. The purpose of the state is to protect and express the nation, and the bond between them is deep. The nation, on the other hand, provides the state with a strong identity in the international environment and a strong base of domestic legitimacy enabling it to resist domestic upheavals.

The second model is the **state-nation**. In contrast to the nation-state, the state-nation model implies that the state plays a significant role in creating the nation. The purpose of the state is to generate uniform cultural elements that in the long term would produce a national cultural entity that would identify with the state. This may require the absorption or subordination of indigenous nations and may, thus, involve efforts to obliterate existing identities in order to create

a single new nationality. Such efforts may, in some cases, provide the justification for citizens to resist the policies of the state.

A strong, well-established state-nation will differ from a nation-state in respect of the security implications of the state-nation link. But weak states that have to deal with a diversity of indigenous national identities will be highly vulnerable and insecure in this regard. The idea of the state as represented by the state-nation will be weakly developed and poorly established and, thus, vulnerable to challenge and interference from within and externally. Separatists may try to take advantage, or one domestic group may try to dominate the nation-building process for its own advantage. The whole process may also be penetrated by stronger external cultures. So long as such states fail to solve their nationality problem, they remain vulnerable to dismemberment, intervention, instability, and internal conflict in ways not normally experienced by states in harmony with their nations.

The third model is the **part nation-state**. This implies that a nation, like the Kurds, is divided among two or more states. The idea of the unified nation-state frequently exercises a strong hold on part nation-states and can easily become an obsessive and overriding security issue. Part nation-states frequently commit themselves to an intense version of the state-nation process in an attempt to build up their legitimacy by differentiating their part of the nation from the other parts. Part nation-states, therefore, represent a severe source of insecurity both to themselves and to others. This case offers the maximum level of contradiction in the idea of national security, for it is precisely the nation that makes the idea of the state insecure.

Finally, the fourth model is the **multination-state**. It comprises those states that contain two or more nations within their boundaries. Two sub-types exist within this model: **federative states** and **imperial states**. Federative states reject the nation-state as the ideal type. A federative state does not simply have a federal political structure, but rather states that contain two or more nations without trying to impose an artificial state-nation over them. Separate nations are allowed, even encouraged to pursue their own identities, and attempts are made to structure the state in such a way that no one nationality comes to dominate the whole state structure. Although they function according to liberal principles, federative states have no natural unifying principle and, consequently, are more vulnerable to dismemberment, separatism, and political interference than are nation-states. Nationality issues pose a constant source of insecurity for the state and national security can easily be threatened by purely political action.

Imperial states are those in which one of the nations within the state dominates the state structures to its own advantage. The dominant nation may seek to suppress the other nationalities by various means with a view of transforming itself into a nation-state. It may also seek simply to retain its dominance, using the machinery of the state to enforce its position, without trying to eliminate or absorb other groups. In addition, it may adopt a more subtle approach of cultivating a pervasive non-nationalist ideology, such as Islam, which appears to transcend the national issue while in fact perpetuating the status quo.

Imperial states are vulnerable to threats aimed at their national division. Such states may be threatened by separatism; by shifts in the demographic balance of nations; or by dismemberment. The stability of the

imperial state depends on the ability of the dominant nation to retain control. If its ability is weakened either by internal developments or external intervention, the state structure stands at risk of complete collapse. Political threats are, thus, a key element in the national security problem of imperial states.

The previous analysis makes it clear that national security in regard to the nation/state link can be read in several different ways and that, consequently, different states will experience very different kinds of insecurity and security in relation to the nationality question. Some states will derive great strength from their link to the nation, whereas for others, the tensions between state and nation will define their weakest and most vulnerable point.

The importance of the nation as a vital component of the idea of the state needs to be measured both internally and externally. Unless the idea of the state is firmly planted in the minds of its citizens, the state has no secure foundation. Unless the idea of the state is firmly planted in the minds of the other states, the state has no secure environment.

While the concept of nation provides one with considerable insight into the relationship between the idea of the state and the problem of national security, it falls short of exhausting the subject. Apart from nationalism, there are additional notions of purpose in the organizing ideology of the state that are less deeply rooted and, therefore, more vulnerable to disruption.

Organizing Ideologies.

The idea of the state can take many forms, with organizing ideologies being the most obvious type. The Arab-Israeli case manifests that many varieties of political, economic, religious, and social ideologies

can serve as an idea of the state, and any one of them is closely connected to the institutional structures of the state. Organizing ideologies purport to address the bases of relationships between government and society and define the conditions for both harmony and conflict in domestic politics. If these ideas themselves are weak, or "if they are weakly held within society; or if strongly held, but opposed, ideas compete within society: then the state stands on fragile political foundations."⁴¹

Two factors magnify the problem for the states to be built around a particular ideology: first, most organizing ideologies are themselves essentially contested concepts; and second, organizing ideologies can be penetrated, distorted, corrupted, and eventually undermined by contact with other ideas. Among other things, the identification of the security of the state with a particular ideology implies that the security of the state may be constantly challenged. With reference to the present analysis, the importance of ideology as an organizing principle of the state is highlighted by two cases: that of the conflict between secularism and Islamism in Turkey, and that of the conflict between autocracy and democracy, Pan-Arabism and nationalism, and moderate and radical Islamism in the Arab countries. Both the idea of nation and organizing ideologies point out that where the idea of state is weak, then a lapse in institutional strength might invite domestic upheavals which may, in turn, threaten the existence of state.

The Institutions of the State.

The institutions of state comprise the entire machinery of government, including its executive, legislative, administrative, and judicial branches as well as

the laws, procedures, and norms which underline their operation.⁴² To understand the relevance of the institutions of state to security, one needs to ask the question: How does a state in which the “idea of state” is weak or nonexistent react to potential and actual domestic upheavals? This question raises the image of a maximal state in which an élite commands the machinery of government, particularly the armed forces and the police, and uses it to run the state in its own interests. The idea of the state in such a case would amount to the ruling élite’s definition of its own self-interest. The coherence of the state would be preserved by the use of the state’s coercive powers against its citizens.

However, given the total size of government machinery, what might be seen as a ruling élite may encompass a rather large group. Since the state machinery has significant resources in its disposition, it can attract support from a rather large number of people. If the support of a sufficient number of people is assured, then the administrative and coercive powers of the state can be sustained without any general element of popular support. This is especially so if the public is not politically mobilized or because the government has not made its exploitation intolerable and continues to provide services such as national defense, internal security, and social welfare.

The employment of negative ideology might serve as a useful means of attracting external resources, as in the case of regimes that drew aid from foreign countries by following policies against the donors’ rivals. The Cold War history has shown that the existence of common ideology among states can also be utilized for generating external support for the policies of a particular government. Finally, resort to common culture, religion, and race may serve to attract external

support, too. For example, using its religious affinity with the other Arab states and their shared culture, Iraq sought to attract support for its policies during the 1990s.

Ideologies have much broader roots than the state in that they exist independently of any particular state. For this reason, governments can draw legitimacy from identifying with an ideology because it ties them to ideas and purposes larger than their own self-interest. The institutions of the state, however, have to be structured so as to express and amplify the ideology. Thus, ideas and institutions are strongly interconnected. This interdependence means that institutions and organizing ideologies tend to stand or fall together in the context of any particular state.

The institutions of the state are much more tangible than the idea of state as an object of security. Therefore, institutions can be destroyed much more easily than ideas. They can be threatened by force or by political action based on ideas that have different institutional implications. When institutions are threatened by force, the natural reaction is defense. When they are threatened by opposing ideas, the danger is that their legitimacy will be eroded. Armed force may sustain them, but institutions without mass support are precariously positioned. On this basis, institutions vary enormously in terms of their domestic stability. For weak states, the principal threats to security come from within the state rather than from outside.

The security problems of governing institutions constitute only a part of the whole national security problem. Governing institutions may change without interrupting the continuity of the state. This implies that, on the domestic level, the security of the government can be much easier differentiated from the secu-

urity of the state than on the international level where state and government are almost inseparable. Nevertheless, there is a growing tendency that, even on the international plane, the security of the governments is disassociated from the security of the state. One implication of this distinction is that governments may serve as legitimate targets of external intervention. During the period following the second Gulf War, for instance, the Western countries drew a sharp distinction between the Iraqi Government, which was held responsible for the developments in the region, and the Iraqi people, who were regarded as the propaganda victims of the regime of Baghdad.

If a government is under attack by foreign intervention, then it can legitimately invoke national security in its own defense. In sociopolitically strong states, the government need not feel necessarily threatened by such linkages. But in weak states where the government institutions have only superficial roots in their societies, this issue can be of great significance. On the other hand, drawing a line between indirect external intervention and legitimate internal political struggle is not easy. In either case, the problem of national security is that governments can exploit the linkage between their own security and that of the state to increase their leverage in domestic politics and defeat domestic opponents. In this sense, the main political function of national security is to justify the use of force. The latter is more legitimate in the international than in the domestic arena; but if national security can be invoked, then it acquires greater legitimacy in the domestic context.

If domestic security can be permanently tied into national security, then the government can protect itself with the whole apparatus of a police state. A

great temptation exists for governments to appeal to national security in their own defense by identifying domestic political opposition with the policies of some foreign state. This temptation is particularly strong for governments that are weakly founded in their domestic environment, and which consequently face strong domestic opposition.

The previously mentioned domestic-international linkages give governments a sustained interest in each other's domestic affairs. This problem is inherent to international system. One way of reducing the impact of those linkages is to create domestic institutional stability by enhancing the sociopolitical cohesion between government and society. On this factor lies the answer as to whether the dominant threat to the government comes from outside or inside the state.

The Physical Base of the State.

The physical base of the state refers to its population and territory, including all of the natural resources and wealth contained within its borders.⁴³ Because of its relative concrete character, states share similar security concerns with reference to their physical base. Yet, the concrete character of the physical base makes threats against it considerably easy to be determined. These threats may include seizure of territory, killing of people, or exploitation of natural resources by a foreign state. The killing of people may be a result of an intra- or an interstate war, but may also be caused by environmental disasters.

However, a quite different threat to population can arise from human migrations whether voluntary or forced.⁴⁴ This threat works primarily on the societal level, especially when the incoming population is of a different cultural, linguistic, or ethnic group. This

threat can also work in the economic and environmental sectors of security when immigrants overburden a fragile environment or compete for scarce resources.

A more serious anomaly arises in the case of states that define their security in terms of territory and population not under their control. This can occur because members of a nation are occupying territory outside the bounds of the nation-state, or because the state has been deprived of some territory seen as crucial to the national interest, such as in the case of Syria with reference to the Golan Heights. In such cases, the security dimension of the physical base takes on a quite different quality from the interest in protecting an already acquired domain.

As it has already been noted, states, and particularly weak ones, face significant threats at the sociopolitical level. For a better understanding of the types of threats that states are faced with at the sociopolitical level, as well as the security ramifications stemming from their operation, one should examine the different levels to which the concept of "security" applies, as well as the connections between these levels. By levels, one means the perspective from which one observes and tries to explain political phenomena. But what can one conclude about the state as an object of security from the survey of its three components as well as from the various types of threats that it may face?

THE STATE-SOCIETY/CITIZENSHIP RELATIONSHIP

Looking within the units, one searches for connections between the security of individuals or groups, on the one side, and the security of states on the other.⁴⁵ The relevance of individual and group security to

national security lies in the connections and contradictions between personal insecurity and state security, in the sense that the state is a major source of both threats to, and security for the individuals. On the other hand, individuals provide the reason for, and the limits to, the security-seeking activities of the state. Given that individuals are the prime cause of each other's insecurity, the question of personal security takes a broader societal and political dimensions and leads to questions about the basic nature of the state.⁴⁶

Individuals, especially when they are organized in groups, can pose serious threats to the state. This can particularly be done through resistance to the government, terrorist activities, and separatist movements. On the other hand, the state may pose many threats to individuals. These threats can be divided into four categories: (1) those arising from domestic law making and enforcement; (2) those arising from direct administrative or political action by the state; (3) those arising from struggles over control of the state machinery; and (4) those arising from the state's external security policies.⁴⁷

The main conclusion that can be drawn from the analysis of the minimal and maximal conceptions of the state is that there is no necessary harmony between individual security and the security of the state. While the state provides some security to the individual, it can only do so by imposing threats. Historical evidence indicates that strong states need only provide some security, and that they can get away with being a considerable source of threat themselves. On the other hand, weak states not only cannot provide adequate security for themselves, but most importantly, their efforts to do so enhance the insecurity of the individuals and groups who are their component units. Where state and citizens are severely at odds, domestic disar-

ray may threaten the coherence of the state in ways that make the concept of national security difficult to apply. Thus, unlike weak states, strong ones enjoy a wide tolerance for their inefficiencies and perversities in relation to domestic security.

STATE DIFFERENTIATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY

Two important conclusions can be drawn from this analysis.⁴⁸ First, each of the three components of the state presents itself in a wide variety of options. When combined, these result in an open-ended spectrum of combinations around which a state might be structured. Because of their diversity, the particular nature of the national security problem differs substantially from state to state. Second, the different components of the state appear vulnerable to different kinds of threat (military, political, economic, societal, and environmental) which makes national security a problem in many dimensions rather than just a matter of military defense. The idea of state, its institutions, and even its territory can all be threatened as much by the manipulation of ideas as by the wielding of military power.

These conclusions make it clear that states vary in more than their size and status as powers. Most importantly, they vary in terms of their degree of socio-political cohesion, which is the very essence of what qualifies them to stand as states.⁴⁹ When the idea and institutions of a state are both weak, then it may be argued that that entity is less of a state than one in which the idea and institutions are strong. In fact, the distinction between weak and strong states runs against the claim of "states being like units."⁵⁰ The latter claim stems not only from the possession of sovereignty

by states, but also from the tendency of observing them from an external-systemic perspective. As Barry Buzan points out:

. . . when observed from outside, states appear to be much more definite and similar than they are viewed from within. From outside, they appear as entities in which governments exercise control over territories and populations that are, for the most part, neither ruled nor claimed by other states. Most of these states either recognise, or treat with one another as sovereign equals, and even the weakest ones can exercise their right to vote in international institutions.⁵¹

This external perspective distorts the view in relation to national security by hiding the internal security dimension. National security cannot be considered apart from the internal structure of the state, and the view from within frequently exposes the superficial image of the state as a coherent object of security. A strong state defines itself from within and stands vis-à-vis its neighbors with a solid sociopolitical presence. On the other hand, due to its lack of sociopolitical coherence, a weak state defines itself more as the gap between its neighbors.

Whatever the reasons for their existence, the principal distinguishing feature of weak states is their concern with domestically generated threats to the security of the government. In other words, weak states have not achieved a domestic political and societal consensus of sufficient strength to eliminate the large-scale use of force as a major and continuing element in their domestic political life. This indicator connects back to the internal security dimension of the relationship between the state and its citizens. It also raises the problem of defining the boundary in levels of do-

mestic use of force because even the strongest states require some level of domestic policing.

The distinction between states with serious domestic security problems and states whose primary security concerns are external is crucial to the understanding of national security. The latter usually refers to the relationship of the state to its external environment, and becomes profoundly confused to the extent that the state is insecure within itself. Unless the internal dimension is relatively stable as a prior condition, the image of the state as a referent object for security diminishes.

Where the state is strong, national security can be viewed primarily in terms of protecting the components of the state from outside threat and interference.⁵² The idea of the state, its institutions, and its territory are clearly defined and stable. Approved mechanisms for adjustment, change, and transfer of power exist, and have sufficient public support so that they are not threatened from within the state. Where the state is weak, only its physical base, and sometimes not even that, may be sufficiently defined as an object of national security. Because its idea and its institutions are internally contested to the point of violence, they are not "national" in scope and cannot consequently serve as objects of national security.

Very weak states do not possess either a widely accepted and coherent idea of the state among their populations, or a governing power strong enough to impose unity in the absence of political consensus. The fact that they exist as states is due to the recognition received by other states which do not wish to dispute the existence of the former. Observed from outside they look like states, but viewed from within, they are characterized by a significant degree of dis-

order. Within weak states, different armed groups often control their own territories and contest central government, and each other, by force.

Strong states, on the other hand, provide a relatively clear referent object for national security. They have a single source of authority that commands a broad legitimacy among the population. Because state and society are closely linked together, indigenous domestic issues play a relatively minor role in national security concerns. However, even a strong state must protect itself against subversive external penetration. But for a strong state, the concept of national security is primarily about protecting its independence and way of life from external threats, rather than from threats arising within its own borders.

As far as weak states are concerned, the referent of national security is hard to define, and the primarily external orientation of the concept gives way to an increasingly domestic agenda of threats. When governments rule more by power than by consensus and when their authority is seriously contested internally by forceful means, then much of the sociopolitical meaning begins to drain out of the concept of national security. When political power and ideology within the state do not command broad legitimacy, or are contested by force, there is no clear content to such central elements of national security as political ideology and institutions. Even the notion of self-government can be questioned in cases where a minority dominates the majority by force.

The political conditions of weak states often propel the military into government as the only organization possessing the power and/or the legitimacy to hold the state together. Strong governments (in the sense of being dictatorial and oppressive), especially mili-

tary ones, usually indicate a weak state. Governments in weak states often have serious concerns about threats to their own authority and security. These threats can take many forms including military coups, secessionist movements, mass uprisings, and political factionalism.

The weaker a state is, the more ambiguous the concept of national security becomes in relation to it. To use the term "national security" in relation to a very weak state, as if such a state represented the same type of object as a strong state, is not advisable. This is because such action would simply open the way for the importation of national security imperatives into the domestic political arena with all the dangers of legitimized violence that this could imply.⁵³ The security of governments would, thus, become confused with the security of states, and factional interests would be legitimized.

The concept of national security requires national objects as its points of reference. In many weak states, these objects hardly exist. In weak states, where the idea of the state is absent and their governing institutions are themselves the main threat to many individuals, national security almost ceases to have content. Therefore, it can be more appropriate to view security in weak states in terms of the contending groups. To view a weak state like Lebanon in the same security terms as one would view Greece would be misleading.

In a strong state, one might expect considerable (though not total) correlation between the government's view of national security and the set of referent objects. In weaker states, this correlation declines, and one needs to be more suspicious of the assumption that national security is what the government wishes it to be. There will almost always be useful grounds

for testing government assertions about national security against suspicions that more sectional interests are being promoted.

Domestic threats are to a considerable extent endemic to states with no clear machinery for political succession. But are such threats to be considered part of the national security problem? Are they really threats to the state or to the nation, or are they simply threats to the narrower interests of the ruling group? Should they be seen merely as a form of domestic political process and, therefore, as an expression of the sovereign right of self-rule rather than as a threat to that right? According to Buzan, firm answers to these questions lead to awkward dilemmas.⁵⁴ If domestic threats are accepted as a national security problem, then the government is provided with a powerful tool to legitimize the use of force against its political opposition. In practice, this is often what happens. As well as posing obvious moral issues, the opening up of national security to include domestic threats raises serious logical criticisms about the distinction between the security of the government and the security of the state or nation. There is an important linkage between the two, as indicated by the fact that strong states will often fight major wars to protect their system of government. But in weak states, this linkage is very problematic because of the narrowness of the government's political base in relation to the state as a whole.

But if domestic threats are not accepted as part of the national security problem, other equally serious difficulties arise. The fate of the government cannot be wholly separated from the issue of national security even in the weak state. The government is both an important symbol and a major manifestation of the state. The fate of particular governments may not be

of much account to the state as a whole, but weakness of government brings into the question the territorial integrity and even the existence of the state and therefore has to be regarded as a national security issue. Buzan wonders:

How does one distinguish between the sectional interests of any particular government's claim that its own security is a national security issue, and the broader national security problem raised by the overall fact of weak socio-political cohesion?⁵⁵

Domestic political fragmentation also makes the state exceptionally vulnerable to penetration by external political interests. In weak states, domestic threats to the government can almost never be wholly separated from the influence of outside powers, and in this sense, the domestic security problems of weak states are often hopelessly entangled with their external relations. Almost by definition, weak states will be chronically insecure. In addition, foreign intervention in weak states becomes much harder to assess in national security terms because outside powers will be helping factions that are themselves in conflict. Who should be classed as an enemy and who as an ally simply depends on one's point of view, or, in the longer term, on which side wins. Finally, due to their sociopolitical vulnerability, weak states are considerably more open than the strong ones to the dynamics of securitization.

CONCLUSION

But what does all this mean for the U.S. policy-makers in general and the U.S. Army in particular? Due to the effects of interdependence, the security

of the United States is closely tied to the security of other states and regions. Therefore, it is imperative for the United States to be able to prevent domestic conflicts or manage civil wars and political changes in third world states. This requires that security analysts are able to provide a systematic and comprehensive analysis of the security situation in third world countries that take account of a state's societal components (groups) and their organizing ideologies. Unless U.S. policymakers know what groups may be involved in a conflict situation, how these groups think, and what these groups want, it is difficult to devise effective conflict prevention or conflict containment and resolution strategies. In practice, dispatched U.S. troops will find it difficult not only to keep peace, but more importantly, to support effective peacemaking, peace-building and state-building strategies.

Since international peace and stability is based on the quality of states, U.S. policymakers should devise interventionist policies that aim at creating strong states. However, in order to not only understand in what kind of situation the United States wishes or is obliged to intervene, but also what kind of situation it needs to create in the post-intervention period, the American analyst and policymaker needs to be familiar with the security *problematique* of the target state. Since the U.S. Army will be called on to intervene, the effectiveness of its operations will depend to a great extent on the quality of the security analysis performed by the analysts prior to intervention. The more and better the quality of information given to the U.S. Army, the more prepared it would get and the more effective its operations would be.

Because security is context dependent, its sectorial analysis in conjunction with a focus on its human

dimension would assist the U.S. policymakers to formulate policies that are also context dependent and, therefore, more effective. Since the U.S. Army will be on the ground to monitor and assist the implementation of such policies, devising appropriate and context-dependent policies are central to the effectiveness of the Army's operations.

Because the relationship between the state and its citizens is at the core of a state's security *problematique*, the realization that states differ from one another and that people have different degrees of allegiance to central authority is fundamental to the successful planning and implementation of U.S. Army's peace and stabilization operations. To make the U.S. Army's operations more effective, it requires prior knowledge about the political, economic, societal, and cultural environment within which these operations would take place as well as the acquisition of a new set of skills that would allow the U.S. Army to handle sensitive situations relevant to this environment.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

The United States is a global power with global interests and global responsibilities. Due to the presence of several weak states in the international system, **the United States needs to devise and employ strategies aimed at preventing the outbreak of domestic conflicts** that have the potential of undermining regional and international peace and stability. **Once domestic conflict erupts, it is imperative for U.S. policymakers to be able to contain and manage it** before it spreads beyond a state's boundaries thereby threatening international peace and stability. To be able to devise and implement effective preventive or conflict man-

agement policies, **U.S. policymakers need to be fully aware of what groups are involved in any given conflict, their ideologies and their end goals.**

The design and implementation of successful intervention strategies and policies depend on the quality of the information available as well as the quality of the analysis of this information. Therefore, U.S. policymakers, in general, and the U.S. Army in particular, should always **strive to improve the quality of intelligence and the process of intelligence analysis.**

For preventive or conflict management purposes, the United States should first employ all its political, diplomatic, and economic assets before it would consider the deployment of its troops. Before U.S. troops are deployed, **U.S. planners and policymakers should have a comprehensive picture of the political and security situation in the countries experiencing domestic strife.** This is imperative if troops are to be used effectively in stabilization and peace operations. **U.S. planning should avoid oversimplifications** based on the idea of "the enemy of my enemy is my friend." Consequently, policymakers should have a comprehensive view of the relationship between the state that experiences domestic conflict and its society. This, in turn, requires a **comprehensive understanding of that state's citizens' competing identities and loyalties as well as of intergroup relations.**

U.S. policymakers should be aware that states differ from one another in many ways and, therefore, their national security question is context dependent. Consequently, the United States may need to approach various conflict and security situations in different ways. Because the effective management of a conflict situation is context dependent, the devise and implementation of peacemaking and peace/state-

building policies requires **U.S. strategists to have a clear understanding of what constitutes a security issue for social groups and individuals in the countries experiencing conflicts.** This, in turn, requires that U.S. strategic planning and actions should be based on the adoption of the broaden definition of security as well as the idea of human security.

Since the effective management of a conflict situation is context dependent, **U.S. troops need to be aware of the possible cultural aspects of the peace operations they are involved.** It is very encouraging that the U.S. troops now receive training for increasing their awareness of and sensitivity to cultural issues, thereby increasing their overall operational effectiveness. However, apart from the necessity in maintaining high quality training programs, a factor that should always be kept in mind is that, because of the character of many developing and less developed countries, **acquired skills and competences should be more locally focused than state context dependent.** Because international stability is based to a significant degree on the stability of the international system's components (states), **the United States needs to assist the creation and maintenance of "strong" states.**

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